Towards a strategy for offshore wind power in Sweden by Jacobsson, Staffan et al.
160
15  
TOWARDS A 
STRATEGY FOR 
OFFSHORE WIND 
POWER IN SWEDEN
Staffan Jacobsson 
Kersti Karltorp 
Department of Energy and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology*
Fredrik Dolff 
Miljöbyrån Ecoplan AB, Göteborg
*Division of Environmental Systems Analysis 
Chapter reviewer: Björn Sandén, Environmental Systems Analysis, Energy and Environment, Chalmers.
INTRODUCTION
The first offshore wind power farm was built in 1991 (in Denmark) but the diffusion 
of wind turbines took place mainly onshore.1 By 2013, European offshore turbines 
supplied 24 TWh but there are expectations of a supply of 140 TWh by 2020.2 
For 2030, UK and Germany expect the supply to increase to about 115 and 87 
TWh respectively.3 The longer term potential is much larger and in the European 
Commission’s Vision 2050 scenario analysis, 800 TWh are supplied (see Chapter 
3 on the global potential).4 Hence, offshore wind power is seen as a strategic 
technology in EU’s efforts to decarbonise electricity generation.
Multifaceted government policies are applied in mainly UK, Germany and Den-
mark to support development and deployment of offshore wind power, that is, 
1  This chapter draws on Jacobsson, S. and Karltorp, K. (2013) Mechanisms blocking the dynamics of the European offshore 
wind energy industry – challenges for policy intervention, Energy Policy, 63:1182-1195; Jacobsson et al. (2013) Bidrag till 
en handlingsplan för havsbaserad vindkraft i Sverige – för säkrad eltillförsel, stabilt klimat och industriell utveckling (Report 
2013:11) Gothenburg, Sweden: Environmental Systems Analysis, Chalmers University of Technology. We are grateful to Västra 
Götalandsregionen for co-funding and providing an arena for discussing our work 
2  Beurskens, L., Hekkenberg, M. and Vethman, P. (2011) Renewable Energy Projections as Published in the National Renew-
able Energy Action Plans of the European Member States. Petten, the Netherlands: ECN and EEA. (ECN-E--10-069).
3  E.ON (2011) E.ON Offshore Wind Energy Fact book. Düsseldorf Germany: E.ON Climate & Renewables, states that the goals 
are 33 and 25 GW respectively and we assume a capacity factor of 40%.
4  In European Commission (2011) Energy Roadmap 2050, Impact assessment and scenario analysis. Brussels, Belgium: Euro-
pean Commission (SEC (2011) 1565)., the average supply of offshore wind power in five decarbonisation scenarios is 234 GW, 
or 818TWh with 40% capacity factor.S
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interventions are not limited to forming a market but include other dimensions in 
the industrialisation of the technology. Expectations of an extensive deployment 
are shared by many firms in the value chain, including component suppliers, 
turbine manufacturers, utilities, harbours, shipyards and logistics firms. A whole 
industrial system has begun to develop in northern Europe.
In this chapter, we argue that Sweden should shift from a passive to an active 
stance towards offshore wind power and initiate a process that eventually leads 
to a large-scale deployment. In the next section, we argue that offshore wind 
power is a desirable technology to develop in Sweden and we suggest a target for 
Sweden in 2030. This is followed by an analysis of mechanisms that may obstruct 
meeting that target and points to ways of overcoming these. In the final section, we 
discuss how a strategy for Sweden could be formed.
WHY BUILD OFFSHORE WIND TURBINES IN SWEDEN?
There is a significant potential for offshore wind power in Sweden, as there is 
in Finland and in the Baltic Sea Region at large.5 An example may illustrate the 
scale involved. If (i) 3000 km2 of a total of 30 000 km2 of Swedish waters which 
the Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-operation (BASREC) judges to be attractive for 
offshore wind power is put aside for that purpose,6 (ii) 5 MW is installed per km2 
and (iii) these have a capacity factor of 40% (3500 hours per year), the annual 
supply would be more than 50 TWh, or about one third of current Swedish supply 
of electricity. A number of firms have seen this potential and about 24 TWh could 
be produced in projects where firms currently either have or are applying for 
permissions to build offshore wind farms.
But, is an extensive deployment desirable in Sweden? In the debate, two argu-
ments are frequently put forward against investment in new capacity to supply 
electricity from renewable energy sources. First, Sweden is currently a net 
exporter of electricity and is expected to remain so for some time.7 Second, 
Sweden has already met its EU 2020 goal.
While correct technically, these arguments are weak in that they have a too short 
time horizon and focus on Sweden only. First, there is a considerable risk that a 
substantial production gap will emerge in Sweden, and in the larger Nordpool 
area, when the aging nuclear power plants (35 years on average) reach the end 
of their lifetimes. With, say, a 50 years’ life-time, there may be a production gap of 
about 30 TWh for Sweden in 2032 and more beyond that date (Figure 15.1).8 For 
Nordpool, the gap may exceed 100 TWh in 2035.
5 This includes the west coast of Sweden and the Danish isles.
6 Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-operation (BASREC) (2012) Conditions for deployment of wind power in the Baltic Sea Region, 
Berlin, Germany and Stockholm, Sweden: BASREC.
7  Naturvårdsverket (2012) Underlag till en färdplan för ett Sverige utan klimatutsläpp 2050. Bromma, Sweden: Swedish Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. (Report 6537).
8  For nuclear power, we use the average production per reactor for the past ten years and add some supply since investments 
in new capacity have been made. For wind power and biopower, we use the Swedish Energy Agency’s (2013) long-term scenario 
from which we also have taken data on electricity demand. Their scenario ends in 2030 and the production of wind and biopower 
is assumed to remain at the level in 2030 (33 TWh). For hydro power, we use the average production 2003-2012 which was 65 
TWh. For details, see Jacobsson et al. (2013) Bidrag till en handlingsplan för havsbaserad vindkraft i Sverige – för säkrad eltillför-
sel, stabilt klimat och industriell utveckling (Report 2013:11) Gothenburg, Sweden: Environmental Systems Analysis, Chalmers 
University of Technology.
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Figure 15.1 The emerging gap between electricity use and supply in Sweden. Source: Jacobsson et al. (2013).
Whereas the time-frame may be thought of as long, it is not long in the context 
of building new capacity. The environmental assessment of the Finnish nuclear 
plant in Olkiluoto started in 19989 and the reactor is not expected to be finished 
until 2016. Also offshore wind power farms have long lead-times. Several larger 
projects in Swedish waters expect to take about 15 years from the first idea to 
completion (Blekinge Offshore, Stora Midsjöbanken) and industry representatives 
emphasise the long lead-times of new projects – about 9-14 years.
Second, in the EU as a whole, the size of the expected production gap is immense 
– between 2020 and 2050 new investments may be required to supply close to 
3000 TWh of renewable electricity (Figure 15.2).10 It is, therefore, not helpful to 
frame the debate as if this were an irrelevant issue – Sweden is part of the EU 
and cannot be isolated from the implications of the goal of decarbonising the EU 
electricity supply in a few decades.
Initiating an extensive deployment now would, thus, contribute to ensuring that 
9  Energimyndigheten (2010) Kärnkraften nu och i framtiden. Eskilstuna, Sweden: Swedish Energy Agency. (ER 2010:21).
10  In this scenario we have made the following assumptions: Electricity demand continues to increase at the same rate as 
between the years 2001 and 2010, i.e. 0.85% per year. This gives an electricity demand of nearly 5 000 TWh in 2050. All 
electricity generation from fossil fuels are phased out by 2050, a decrease of 1676 TWh. The life-span of existing nuclear plants 
is 50 years, which gives a production of 15.4 TWh in 2050, a decrease by 906 TWh. By 2020, the National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans estimate to add 578 TWh from renewable energy sources (Beurskens, L., Hekkenberg, M. and Vethman, P. (2011) 
Renewable Energy Projections as Published in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the European Member States. 
Petten, the Netherlands: ECN and EEA. (ECN-E--10-069) p. 263). New nuclear plants are expected to produce 527 TWh, which 
is the average from the Energy Roadmap 2050 five decarbonisation scenarios. With these assumptions, there will be a need to 
invest in capacity to supply nearly 2900 TWh between 2020 and 2050. For more details, see see Jacobsson et al. (2013) Bidrag 
till en handlingsplan för havsbaserad vindkraft i Sverige – för säkrad eltillförsel, stabilt klimat och industriell utveckling (Report 
2013:11) Gothenburg, Sweden: Environmental Systems Analysis, Chalmers University of Technology. Through ambitious energy 
saving measures, the sum may be reduced but the challenge is still huge.
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Sweden and Nordpool countries have access to the required volumes of electricity 
when the nuclear plants are taken off-line. The potential is also large enough to 
allow for a substantial contribution to meeting EU’s goal through electricity export.
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Figure 15.2 The emerging gap between electricity use and supply in EU, including Norway and Switzerland. 
Source: Jacobsson et al. (2013).
A deployment will be associated with new business opportunities. First, available 
evidence suggests that it is cheaper to generate offshore wind power in the Baltic 
Sea than in the North Sea. Indeed, it has been argued that with “inner-sea technol-
ogy” costs may be up to 25-30% lower.11 Sweden may, therefore, develop into a 
cost-efficient supplier of wind power. Second, a deployment would provide a home 
market for suppliers which may simplify for them to take shares of the emerging 
EU market – reaching a goal of 44 GW by 2020 is estimated to involve invest-
ment of about 135 billion EUR.12 As Sweden has a strong engineering industry, 
this market may be a significant source of growth. Some firms are already in the 
industry, such as ABB in transmission, SKF and DIAB in components and GVA in 
marine technology. A home market would be expected to make it easier for firms in 
related industries to follow these and diversify into the offshore wind power supply 
chain. These firms may be found in e.g. steel, cement and shipbuilding industries, 
in shipping as well as in harbours. It may also benefit technology based start-ups, 
such as Hexicon, HM Power, Falkung Environmental Energy and SeaTwirl Energy 
Systems. Third, while these, and other firms, may supply products and services to 
11  The conditions are less harsh in the Baltic Sea with less salty water and smaller waves, which influences the technology which 
is most appropriate, see e.g. Malmberg, H. (2012) Havsbaserad vindkraft i Östersjön. Inventering av frågeställningar och analys 
av förutsättningar för lönsamhet. Stockholm, Sweden: Svensk Vindenergi.
12  KPMG (2010) Offshore Wind in Europe - 2010 Market Report. Germany: KPMG AG 
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft; Rabobank (2011) Reaching EUR 10c/KWh… 10 ways to cut subsidies in offshore wind. 
Utrecht.
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North Sea applications, an early Swedish home market for “inner-sea technology” 
may provide an opportunity to develop new solutions that can be sold to other 
markets. This may even include turbines that are optimised for the wind conditions 
in the Baltic Sea 
In sum, there are strong reasons for initiating an extensive deployment of off-
shore wind turbines. The Vision is to ensure an adequate supply of electricity in 
Sweden and Nordpool by about 2030, contribute to EU’s decarbonisation and 
induce industrial growth in Sweden. It is harder though to set realistic goals with 
respect to deployment in Swedish waters. Varying, but long, lead-times make it 
problematic to assess the speed at which deployment may occur. However, if we 
assume that a supporting regulatory framework is in place in 2015 and if all farms 
with permissions are built, these could be in place between 2019 and 2023 and 
provide about 8 TWh/year. Farms for which permission is being sought could be 
built a few years later, providing about 12 TWh/year. With a supporting framework, 
we would expect yet more farms to be planned and built before 2030. Hence, by 
2030, it is conceivable that 30 TWh could be supplied annually. Even if this figure 
is uncertain, it is noteworthy that it is close to the above estimated production gap 
in the early 2030s. Hence, a preliminary target may be set at 30 TWh/year (8.5 
GW) by 2030.
This is an ambitious target for an industry which is still young and a considerable 
risk is that the supply capacity of the EU capital goods industry will not grow fast 
enough. In 2012, 1.2 GW was built in Europe, a figure which is expected to grow 
to 1.9 GW in 2014.13 Reaching the Swedish goal of 8.5 GW by 2030 would, thus, 
mean that the capital goods industry would sell only to the Swedish market for 
more than four years. To reach the EU goals of 44 GW around 2020 and 234 GW 
by 2050, its capacity must increase significantly. While this illustrates the risks for 
significant bottlenecks, it also highlights the business opportunities involved. In the 
following sections, we identify a number of obstacles to an extensive deployment 
and discuss how they may be removed.
FORMING MARKETS
The Swedish Tradable Green Certificate system (TGC) is designed to induce 
investments in the lowest-cost technologies, which are currently onshore wind 
power and biomass CHP. For four reasons, it is an unsuitable regulatory frame-
work to promote investments in offshore wind farms. First, costs for offshore may 
be 40-50% higher than for onshore.14 This is particularly problematic today (2014) 
when the price of electricity is low at the same time as the certificate price is low. 
The combined revenue dropped from about 9 eurocents/kWh in 2010 to 5 in 
2012.15 Second, a strong fluctuation in the revenue streams creates uncertainties, 
in particular with the long lead-times involved, which is likely to increase the cost of 
capital.
13  EWEA (2013) The European offshore wind industry - key trends and statistics 2012. Brussels, Belgium: European Wind 
Energy Association.
14  Malmberg, H. (2012) Havsbaserad vindkraft i Östersjön. Inventering av frågeställningar och analys av förutsättningar för 
lönsamhet. Stockholm, Sweden: Svensk Vindenergi.; Elforsk (2011) El från nya och framtida anläggningar 2011, Sammanfattande 
rapport. Stockholm, Sweden: Elforsk AB. (Report 11:26).
15 Jacobsson et al. (2013) Bidrag till en handlingsplan för havsbaserad vindkraft i Sverige – för säkrad eltillförsel, stabilt klimat 
och industriell utveckling (Report 2013:11) Gothenburg, Sweden: Environmental Systems Analysis, Chalmers University of 
Technology.
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Third, it is a quota-based system and when the quota is filled, the price of cer-
tificates drops. An investment in an offshore wind farm is so large that it may fill 
the quota and, therefore, lead to reduced income for all investors, including the 
firm that makes that investment. An extensive deployment of offshore wind power 
would therefore require a political guarantee that the quota is increased - a politi-
cal risk. Fourth, if the quota increases at the rate required to induce an extensive 
deployment of offshore wind turbines, it would raise the price of the certificates16 
and, consequently, lead to large rents for investors in less costly technologies.17
For these reasons, we propose that another policy is used. Inspiration may be 
sought in three leading countries. The German feed-in law provides a fixed and 
technology-specific payment per kWh for a given number of years. The pay-
ment increases with distance from shore and a “sprinter bonus” is given to early 
investors. UK is shifting to a similar system and feed-in tariffs (strike prices) were 
recently published. Finally, Denmark applies an auctioning system where the win-
ner receives a feed-in tariff. 
Swedish Wind Energy 18 proposes an auctioning system which is adjusted to the 
Swedish context where a number of farms have permissions to build. While the 
proposal has merits, there are disadvantages too. Most importantly, auctioning 
generates an unattractive risk-to-revenue ratio. From the perspective of an inves-
tor in an offshore wind farm, there are significant uncertainties with respect to 
technology (including geo-technology), suppliers, construction, grid connection, 
market and politics. These risks are larger for early investors than for followers (as 
learning normally takes place) and investors compare these risks with expected 
revenues. A policy which, in an early phase in the development of the industry, can 
be expected to lead to the desired deployment must involve an attractive balance 
between revenue and these risks. An auctioning tool which prioritises lowest cost 
has a questionable credibility in that respect, even if the political risk is kept low 
and grid connection is guaranteed. 
Long lead times in acquiring permissions (see below) add costs and risks and 
if investors need to do geotechnical studies (which are expensive) to be able 
to make a bid, costs will increase further. All in all, an auctioning procedure is 
likely to be associated with high initial costs, low and uncertain revenues and 
many risks. For an industry which is deemed to be strategic, these features are 
problematic.
We propose instead that a feed-in policy is developed to support the deployment 
of offshore wind turbines. A guaranteed and cost-covering payment for a number 
of years, with a certain risk compensation built in for early investors, creates a 
more attractive balance between risks and revenues. Cost reductions may be 
stimulated, as in Germany and UK, by a gradual reduction in feed-in tariffs for new 
projects. The main challenge is to set the tariffs, which requires that the govern-
ment has the required technology-specific competence. Although the cost level is 
project specific, an initial tariff of around 85öre/kWh is perhaps of the right order 
16  This assumes that the quota cannot be met by deployment of onshore wind power.
17  Bergek, A. and Jacobsson, S. (2010) Are Tradable Green Certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a 
rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008. Energy Policy, 38:1255–1271..
18  Svensk Vindenergi (2013) Särskild satsning på havsbaserad vindkraft. Stockholm, Sweden: Svensk Vindenergi.
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of magnitude; less if investors do not pay for transmission lines to the national 
grid.19 
As there is great uncertainty in the timing of the ”retirement” of the current nuclear 
plants, an expansion in the capacity to supply electricity from offshore wind farms 
needs to be combined with organising for a greater trade in electricity. This would 
involve an increase in the transmission capacity (see Chapter 9) and a regula-
tory framework which guarantees prices that cover costs. A framework could be 
agreed upon by Nordpool and be supplemented with bilateral agreements with 
other countries, such as Germany.20 
PERMISSIONS AND MARITIME SPATIAL PLANNING
Different industries (e.g. fishing) compete over the marine space as does the 
military. Indeed, the military has objected to plans for a 2.5 GW farm (Blekinge 
Offshore) and constitutes a serious obstacle to deployment in Sweden. Environ-
mental concerns put additional items on the agenda, including objections from 
coastal populations (see also Chapters 6 and 8). Applications for permission to 
build offshore farms are, therefore, often contested.
Within the Swedish territorial limit, it is also a complex process to apply for 
permissions, involving many actors, long lead-times, high cost and uncertainty 
for investors.21 For instance, the project developer WPD had to make 11 different 
applications to get permission to build a farm (Storgrundet). The work was started 
in 2006 and in 2013 they reached the stage where they applied for permission to 
build the transmission cable.
The process of applying for permission has to be simplified and speeded up. It 
would help if parts of the sea are dedicated to offshore wind farms. So far, only a 
few European countries (Denmark, Germany and Britain) have done so but such 
areas are needed, as an element in a comprehensive maritime spatial planning, 
to reduce uncertainties for investors and the time and costs of acquiring permis-
sion.22 The recently created Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
has the responsibility to develop a comprehensive policy for the sea and it is 
vital that it develops a plan for offshore wind power (see Chapter 8 for a related 
discussion on other forms of ocean energy). It is, however, important that (i) the 
development of a plan does not delay investments in farms which already have 
permissions (ii) it is done in dialogue with project developers and (iii) the plan is 
flexible to accommodate for new technology and improved knowledge of the sea 
floor.
19  Elforsk (2011) El från nya och framtida anläggningar 2011, Sammanfattande rapport. Stockholm, Sweden: Elforsk AB. (Report 
11:26).; Malmberg, H. (2012) Havsbaserad vindkraft i Östersjön. Inventering av frågeställningar och analys av förutsättningar för 
lönsamhet. Stockholm, Sweden: Svensk Vindenergi.
20  The supply of intermittent power grows quickly in Germany which may reduce the interest in buying intermittent power from 
Sweden (see Chapter 13, Figure 13.2). However, Germany has problems with its deployment of offshore wind farms, has a very 
large gap to fill (both coal and nuclear) and is tormented by a cost discussion (Chapter 14). Imports of relatively cheap Swedish 
offshore wind power may, therefore, be attractive.
21  Beyond the territorial limit, an investor only needs approval from the Government and the process is much easier.
22  Västra Götalandsregionen (2010) Förutsättningar för havsbaserad vindkraft Power Väst; Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-
operation (BASREC) (2012) Conditions for deployment of wind power in the Baltic Sea Region, Berlin, Germany and Stockholm, 
Sweden: BASREC
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TRANSMISSION AND HARBOURS
Investors in offshore wind farms are obliged to pay for building the transmission 
cable and the connection to the land-based grid and, sometimes, to upgrade 
that grid. With an extensive deployment of offshore wind farms, the regulation 
risks leading to inefficiencies due to lack of coordination between investments in 
farms and the grid. Svenska Kraftnät23 emphasises the importance of coordinat-
ing investments in the onshore grid and deployment of wind turbines. Similarly, 
an extensive deployment of off-shore wind farms would require a coordination of 
investments in these and in the offshore grid to ensure cost efficiency and supply 
security.
In Germany and UK, there is an understanding that it is not self-evident how an 
appropriate regulation looks like and both countries have made large changes in 
initial policies. These are made to make sure that investors, neither in the grid nor 
in wind farms, are landed with “stranded assets” and that investments in different 
offshore farms are coordinated with the investments in the grid – instead of build-
ing a separate transmission cables to each farm, synergies are created through a 
common infrastructure.24 Cost efficiency may, therefore, require that farms are built 
in clusters which take us back to maritime spatial planning. Some of these clusters 
may come to cross borders which mean that there may be a need for coordination 
between countries. An example is E.ON’s planned farm Södra Midsjöbanken and 
Polish farms on the other side of the border. As argued by several,25 it may be 
advantageous to build transnational grids with a strengthened capacity for trading 
electricity across borders. This leads to the notion of building an international grid 
that connects several countries in the Baltic Sea region. Such a grid may also help 
handle uncertainties with respect to imbalances between supply and demand due 
to the uncertainties in the life-times of nuclear plants and the intermittent nature of 
wind power production (see Chapter 9).
Harbours constitute another vital infrastructure. A number of European harbours 
invest in facilities for supporting the deployment of offshore wind turbines. One of 
these is Bremerhaven and others are Cuxhaven and Belfast, the latter building a 
100 000 m2 facility.26 This infrastructure is vital for deployment and service of the 
turbines but also as a base for manufacturers of components and turbines. Yet, 
costs for rebuilding harbours are high and in Britain, the government has allocated 
about 150 million EUR to support the transformation of harbours. For investments 
to be taken, it is vital that the regulatory framework for forming markets is credible, 
stable and long-term and that project developers agree to use a particular facility.
FINANCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL
A recurrent theme in the European debate is the gap between the volume of 
capital required to be invested in transforming the energy system and the volume 
23  Svenska Kraftnät (2012) Perspektivplan 2025 – en utvecklingsplan för det svenska stamnätet. Stockholm, Sweden: Svenska 
Kraftnät. 
24  See e.g. EoN (2011) and von la Chevallerie (2013) Clearer path ahead under new grid connection rules, Offshore special 
report, Windpower Monthly, April.
25  See e.g. Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors (2011) UK Offshore Wind: Opportunity, Cost and Financing. London, UK 
and New York, NY, USA: DB Group 
26  Huss, M. (2013) Presentation. Windforce Baltic Sea. Stockholm, Sweden, Feb. 20-21.
168
that is currently invested.27 Industrialists argue that lack of financial capital will 
constitute one of the largest obstacles to an extensive deployment in Sweden. To 
generate a capacity to supply, say, 30 TWh/year may cost in the order of 25 billion 
EUR (with current prices).28 A necessary condition for this capital to be made 
available, at reasonable prices, is that there are long-term and stable regulatory 
frameworks which keep political uncertainties down.29
While such frameworks are necessary, they are probably not sufficient for a 
number of reasons that are further discussed in Chapter 16. First, utilities do not 
have the financial capacity to fund investments over their balance sheet, especially 
if they are engaged in several farms simultaneously. Second, financial actors 
associate offshore wind power with high risk and are therefore hesitant to invest, 
in particular before the farm has been built. Third, the financial crisis reduces 
access to capital from commercial banks. Finally, some banks have developed an 
extensive business which involves short-term speculative investments in financial 
products rather than long-term investments in industrial projects such as offshore 
wind farms.
Deutsche Bank 30concludes that: “Insufficient capacity in debt capital markets, 
perceived risk around policy support frameworks, risk around new technologies 
being rolled out ...have made low carbon infrastructure financing unachievable 
without scaled up Government intervention.”
The German and UK governments responded by strengthening the role of public 
investment banks (KfW and Green Investment Bank), aiming to reduce the risks 
for private investors.31 “Green bonds” is another option where a public bank, say 
SBAB in Sweden, issues green bonds for which the state acts as guarantor. 
Together with a guaranteed feed-in payment, this would not only take away the 
need for risk premium but also open up for e.g. pension funds to channel some 
of their capital into this industry. Creative solutions are, thus, required to ensure 
supply of sufficient capital, at a reasonable cost.
An extensive deployment also necessitates that specialised human capital is 
made available. This includes, e.g. operation and maintenance personnel, staff 
with competence in environmental impact assessment and PhDs in electrical 
engineering who are specialised in grid design and development (see Chapter 16 
for a more detailed discussion). Blekinge Offshore, for example, estimates that 150 
technicians for operation & maintenance will be needed. The scale of this chal-
lenge depends on the target for deployment and the level of ambition for industrial 
growth in the field. With a high level of ambition, bottlenecks will occur but these 
can be reduced by coordinating research and educational policy with energy and 
industrial policies.
27  Jacobsson, R. and Jacobsson, S. (2012) The emerging funding gap for the European Energy Sector – will the financial sector 
deliver? Environmental Innovations and Sustainable Transitions 5:49-59; Rubel et al. (2013) EU 2020 Offshore-Wind Targets. 
The € 110 Billion Financing Challenge. Frankfurt, Germany: The Boston Consulting Group.
28  The cost estimates in Elforsk (2011) El från nya och framtida anläggningar 2011, Sammanfattande rapport. Stockholm, Swe-
den: Elforsk AB. (Report 11:26) would lead to an investment cost of 311billion SEK. Based on indicated costs of current projects 
in Sweden we get 240 billion SEK. For the estimate in the text, we averaged these figures.
29  Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors (2011) UK Offshore Wind: Opportunity, Cost and Financing. London, UK and New 
York, NY, USA: DB Group; Rubel et al. 2013.
30  Deutsche Bank (2011) p. 39.
31  KfW, for instance, invests 5 billion Euros in offshore wind farms.
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
The cost of offshore wind power is expected to decline with increased deployment 
but a deployment further from shore, and in more difficult conditions, may offset 
the effects of learning. Moreover, learning requires dedicated efforts in the whole 
value chain, for example to create standardised solutions for combining founda-
tions and turbines, net connections32 and logistics.33 Other examples are new 
turbine technology, new crane technology in harbours and ships to transport and 
install foundations and turbines.
In order to stimulate technical change that reduces costs and enables industrial 
growth, the leading countries fund organisations for conducting applied R&D and 
contributing to innovation processes. Risø in Denmark is perhaps the most famous 
of these. In Germany, a Fraunhofer institute dedicated to offshore wind power 
was created in 2005 and in Britain, the Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult was 
recently founded, inspired by the Fraunhofer Institute.
The applied R&D focusses on solving problems associated with the severe 
conditions in the North Sea. For Sweden, and other countries around the Baltic 
Sea, “North Sea” technology needs to be supplemented with technology which 
is adjusted to the specific conditions in the Baltic Sea, i.e. “inner sea technol-
ogy”. As mentioned earlier, the difference may constitute an opportunity for firms 
developing along a somewhat different technological trajectory. In part, attractive 
market conditions will induce such efforts but these may be supplemented with an 
applied RD&D (research, development and demonstration) program (co)funded 
by the state and involving universities of technology. While the details of such 
a programme cannot be specified, some examples of knowledge fields may be 
given:34 foundations, including those that can manage ice and technology to install 
foundations; turbines which are dimensioned to wind conditions in the Baltic Sea; 
logistics solutions (including specialised ships) and transmission solutions. A 
further area would be floating turbines – a technology which is independent of sea 
floor conditions and which builds on marine technology, a strength in Sweden.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarise our findings and identify further issues in forming a 
strategy for Sweden. Although an extensive deployment of offshore wind turbines 
is contested, we have argued that it is desirable in order to (i) ensure an adequate 
supply of electricity in Sweden and Nordpool by about 2030 (ii) contribute to EU’s 
decarbonisation and (iii) induce industrial growth. We have also argued for a target 
of about 30 TWh in 2030.
32  Knight, S. (2013) Cabling standards hold key to cutting costs, Offshore special report, Wind Power Monthly April.
33  Huss, M. (2013) Presentation. Windforce Baltic Sea. Stockholm, Sweden, Feb. 20-21.
34  Dalén, G. (2013) Presentation. Windforce Baltic Sea. Stockholm, Sweden, Feb. 20-21.
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Market
Permission
Transmission
Harbours
Financial capital
Human capital
R&D and 
innovation 
Design a feed-in law that provides an attractive balance between risks, costs and 
revenues for investors 
Organise the application process for permission to reduce lead-times and costs, 
inter alia though maritime spatial planning
Find a regulatory framework for extending the onshore and offshore transmission grid that 
guarantees connections and simplifies coordination of investments within and across borders
Create long-term targets as well as stable and attractive conditions necessary for 
harbours to undertake investments
Secure access to the capital required for an extensive deployment and at 
reasonable costs
Secure access to specialised human capital
Form a RD&D program with particular emphasis on technical 
solutions appropriate for the Baltic Sea
Figure 15.3 Policy challenges for offshore wind power in Sweden.
As in other countries, the strategy to reach this goal needs to be multifaceted. 
With respect to market formation policy, we proposed a feed-in law in order to find 
an attractive balance between risks, costs and revenues for investors. An effective 
strategy would also need to incorporate policies that help overcoming obstacles in 
sex other areas, see Figure 15.3
It is urgent to develop and implement the strategy due to the long lead-times in 
many fields. We have referred to those in planning and building the farms but 
they are also present in planning and building transmission grids and in rebuilding 
harbours. Moreover, there are long lead-times in changing regulatory frameworks, 
developing new educational programmes and setting up, conducting and benefit-
ting from an RD&D programme. 
The range of challenges indicates that several government departments and 
agencies need to be involved in formulating and implementing a strategy. We have 
mentioned the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management and Svenska 
Kraftnät (the Swedish National Grid) but there are more, including the Ministry 
Education and Research and Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communica-
tions as well as the Swedish Energy Agency. Their respective policies need to be 
coordinated.
Coordination with other countries in the Baltic Sea region may also be desirable, 
e.g. in terms of grid development. This adds complexity but there are also advan-
tages. Collaborating with Finland, for instance, could give several advantages. 
First, as the physical conditions resemble those in Sweden, coordinating RD&D 
programmes may reduce costs and strengthen industrial growth in both coun-
tries. Second, with a common market formation programme, the region would 
be more attractive for firms in the whole value chain. It may, for example, require 
500-600 turbines to be built over a two-year period in order for firms to undertake 
investment in a specially designed ship to transport and install the turbines. Col-
laborating with Finland would, therefore, be a way to enhance industrialisation in 
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the region as a whole. The form for collaboration may be inspired by the German-
French coordination of ”Energiewende” with a joint office for renewable energy.35 
Third, in order to reduce the negative effect of intermittent supply, a plan for 
locating turbines across the Baltic Sea may be useful. 
Finally, as for further issues to explore in forming a strategy, we need to ascertain 
the cost advantages of “inner-sea technology” and establish how to manage the 
intermittent supply of wind power (Chapter 9 and 11). Again, we need to acknowl-
edge the time horizon. If our target is met, there is close to two decades available 
to solve the issue of intermittency. We should also acknowledge the potential 
growth that may come out of finding solutions, e.g. in the form of electricity storage 
(Chapter 5 and 12) and demand-side management technologies (Chapter 10).
35  Altmeier, P. and Batho, D. (2013) Gemeinsame Erklärung über die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich erneuerbarer Energien und 
die Schaffung eines Deutsch-französischen Büros für Erneuerbare Energien im Rahmen der Energiewende. Paris, France.
